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CLASS, CLASSES, AND CLASSIC RACE-BAITING: WHAT’S
IN A DEFINITION?
ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG†
AMBER FRICKE‡
INTRODUCTION
In his article Class in American Legal Education, Professor Richard
Sander highlights the lack of class diversity within law schools in the
United States, particularly within elite law schools.1 As Sander points
out, law students tend to come from relatively elite class backgrounds,
and Sander urges law schools to pursue class-based affirmative action,
rather than race-based affirmative action, in their admissions processes.2
As a general matter, we agree with Professor Sander that class diversity within a law school and within the legal community is a laudable
goal. Class-based affirmative action is neither an unnecessary nor unwarranted proposal. A number of the arguments asserted in favor of racial
diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger3 also may apply to class diversity. For
example, just like racial diversity, class diversity among students can
contribute to a robust exchange of ideas on legal issues.4 Additionally, to
the extent that law schools “represent the training ground for a large
number of our Nation’s leaders” and to the extent that we want to “cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,” class
diversity, like race diversity, may signal to all citizens that the law school
† Charles M. and Marion Kierscht Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
B.A., Grinnell College; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. E-mail: angelaonwuachi@uiowa.edu. I thank Dean Gail Agrawal and Charles M. and Marion J. Kierscht for their
generous research support. I also thank Catherine Smith, the Associate Dean for Institutional Diversity and Inclusiveness at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, for conversations about
racial diversity in law schools and about this Article in particular. I give special thanks to my husband, Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, and our children, Elijah, Bethany, and Solomon for their constant
love and support.
‡. Law Student, University of Iowa College of Law. B.S.S., Cornell College; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, expected in May of 2012. E-mail: amber-fricke@uiowa.edu.
We thank the editors of the Denver University Law Review for inviting us to be a part of this symposium issue.
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 637
(2011).
2. While Professor Sander does not explicitly argue for the repeal of race-based affirmative
action in his article, he suggests, through his arguments, that the flaws in many race-based affirmative action admissions policies are cause for elimination of the policy, not reform of the policy. Most
tellingly, Sander states, “As we have seen, law schools could do a great deal to foster more SES
diversity without using class-based preferences at all. But there is much to commend going further,
and using mild SES preferences as at least partial substitute for current racial preferences.” Id. at
664 (emphasis added).
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. See id. at 329.
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path to leadership is open to people from a broad range of class backgrounds.5 Indeed, Sander is not the first, nor will he be the last, law professor to address the importance of class diversity within higher education. For example, in their book The Miner’s Canary: Enlisting Race,
Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy, Professors Lani Guinier and
Gerald Torres examine the benefits of coalitions around “political race”
that have enabled barriers to higher education at state universities to
crumble for both disadvantaged white and minority students through the
Texas Ten Percent Plan.6 Additionally, Guinier, in her article Admissions
Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic
Ideals, analyzes how measures for merit in the admissions process correlate more with factors such as parents’ education, grandparents’ socioeconomic status, racial identity, and geographic location than they do
with future academic performance.7 Similarly, in her article Assessing
Class-Based Affirmative Action, Professor Deborah Malamud carefully
analyzes the idea of class-based affirmative action and its potential effectiveness or ineffectiveness at addressing economic inequality.8 Finally, in
the article The Admission of Legacy Blacks, one of us, Professor Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, studies the complexities of class as related to race and
national origin and ethnicity for Blacks9 in the admissions game, encouraging institutions to account for socioeconomic status, race, and national
origin in their processes.10
In this Article, we do not take issue with Sander’s identification of
class diversity as a necessary point for discussion and inclusion among
law professors and deans. Rather, we take issue with the manner in
which Sander sets up the discussion about law school affirmative action
as an either-or proposition, with class on one end and race on the other,
as though the two concerns are mutually exclusive of and incompatible
with each other. More specifically, we contest Sander’s definitions of the
words “class” and “socioeconomic status” and, in many ways, his use of
those words as interchangeable terms in Class in American Legal Educa5.
6.

See id. at 332.
LANI G UINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING D EMOCRACY 67–75 (2002).
7. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 146–51 (2003).
8. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452,
454–71 (1997).
9. Throughout this article, the words “Black” and “White” are capitalized when used as
nouns to describe a racialized group; however, these terms are not capitalized when used as adjectives. Also, the term “Blacks” is used instead of the term “African Americans” because the term
“Blacks” is more inclusive. See Journal of Blacks in Higher Educ. Found., Why “Black” and Not
“African American”?, 3 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 18, 18–19 (1994). Additionally, “[i]t is more
convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between
African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in
Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. I LL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4 (1992).
10. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1141 (2007).
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tion (although such interchangeable use is frequently employed in legal
scholarship, even by the authors).11 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “class” as “a group sharing the same economic or social status”12
and defines “socioeconomic” as “of, relating to, or involving a combination of social and economic factors.”13 Based on these definitions, it is
clear that while one’s class may arguably (though not convincingly) be
defined solely in economic terms, one’s socioeconomic status (SES) necessarily includes social factors such as race.14 In fact, we find Malamud’s
definition of class and economic disadvantage in her article Assessing
Class-Based Affirmative Action most convincing. Like Malamud, at least
with respect to the category of “class,” we “do not mean that [a person]
falls below a predetermined absolute threshold of economic attainment”
when we say that “that a person is economically disadvantaged”;
“[i]nstead, [we mean that] one is economically disadvantaged in [our]
sense of the term when one has fewer economic goods than do members
of some relevant comparison group.”15 In this vein, we question a number of Sander’s comparisons and framings of class and socioeconomic
status within his article. For instance, when Sander speaks of students of
“relatively elite backgrounds,” he rarely notes to which groups these
“elite backgrounds” are relative; he never compares, for example, the
black law students from “relatively elite backgrounds” with their white,
law school peers of “relatively elite backgrounds.”16 Along those same
lines, Sander’s groupings of law school students’ parents by class often
seems to be comparing apples to oranges, such as parents who are registered nurses to those who are doctors.
Finally, we reject what we view as Sander’s misguided attempts to
institute class-based affirmative action in lieu of race-based affirmative
action.17 In so doing, we explain why many of Sander’s arguments in
favor of substituting race-based affirmative action with class-based affirmative action are flawed. We also note numerous substantive reasons
why law schools must continue to pay attention to race. Contrary to what
11. Sander, supra note 1, at 633–34 (defining “class” and “socioeconomic status” by reference to one’s income, education, and occupation, and using the two terms interchangeably “when
statistics are involved”).
12. Class, M- W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/class (last visited June 08,
2011) (emphasis added).
13. Socioeconomic, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socioeconomic
(last visited June 08, 2011) (emphasis added).
14. Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1847, 1866–94 (1996).
15. Malamud, supra note 8, at 453.
16. Sander, supra note 1, at 633 (discussing the prevalence of students from “relatively elite
backgrounds” in top law schools).
17. Race-based affirmative action in legal education usually applies to black Americans,
Latinos, Native Americans, and some Asian ethnicities. However, we have chosen to focus most of
our emphasis on black Americans, considering that (1) Sander also puts great attention on black
Americans, (2) the greatest wealth of available scholarship is on black Americans, and (3) black
Americans are arguably the original, primary intended recipients of affirmative action, considering
our nation’s past history with slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the Civil Rights Movement.
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Sander’s article suggests, race and racism still matter within our society,
and in a way that supports the maintenance of race-based affirmative
action within law schools. In the end, we reject Sander’s contention that
class-based affirmative action would produce similar racial diversity
within law schools.18
Overall, in this Article, we briefly lay out each of our challenges to
Sander’s arguments in Class in American Legal Education. In Part I, we
first address the very problems that Sander’s article highlights about the
difficulties of defining class and SES, problems that may make classbased affirmative action programs less feasible and effective than Sander
suggests. In so doing, we identify what we consider to be defects in
Sander’s class/SES groupings. We also highlight the complexities around
class and race that already exist within law student populations, answering in part the important questions about to whom black law students are
“relatively” advantaged or disadvantaged. In Part II, we focus on responding to Sander’s substantive arguments against race-based affirmative action, demonstrating why class-based affirmative action is an inadequate substitute and why race-based affirmative action is still needed.
I. WHO’S GOT CLASS? THE DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS THAT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PROFESSOR SANDER’S DATA
In making his arguments for the adoption of class-based affirmative
action as opposed to race-based affirmative action, Sander relies on the
following two factors to determine each student subject’s class/SES: the
level of education of the parent(s) of the student and the occupation of
the parent(s) of the student.19 In so doing, however, Professor Sander
does not adequately discuss the inherent difficulties in measuring class
(or what he also refers to as SES) and demarcating persons by class. Instead, Sander overlooks or minimizes the racial implications of his
choices in determining class, even as he admits several flaws in his data.
He also fails to address various concerns about measuring students’ SES
that other legal scholars such as Malamud have raised.
In this Part, we—neither of whom is an empiricist—first address
what we view as Sander’s avoidance and minimizing of the real consequences that flow from the admitted flaws in his means for measuring
SES as well as the consequences that flow from what we view as fatal
flaws in Sander’s methods for demarcating SES quintiles. Thereafter, we
identify what is lost in the analysis because of Sander’s failure to discuss
the inherent difficulties of measuring class and demarcating persons by
class. In particular, we highlight what we believe is lost in Sander’s
18. See Sander, supra note 1, at 660–64.
19. Except where specifically noted in the remaining sections of this Article, we use the terms
“class” and “SES” as Sander does—interchangeably.
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analysis as a result of his failure to address intergenerational wealth and
account for the differences between Blacks and Whites at each defined
SES level.
A. Undercounting, Undervaluing, and Underestimating Difference
As noted above, neither one of us is an empiricist, and as a result,
we are not well-positioned to contest Sander’s data from that angle.
However, even as non-empiricists, we have serious questions about the
validity of Sander’s conclusions in light of the admitted flaws in his data
and in light of some of the assumptions that Sander makes in pushing his
arguments.
For example, we wonder to what extent Sander’s analysis is valid
when the SES status of black students is highly likely to be overrepresented for a significant portion of the black law student sample, a sample
that is already, as Sander notes, quite modest.20 Sander acknowledges
that one flaw in his measurements is that “the SES status of students
from single-parent families will tend to be overstated by the approach
used here”21 and that “Blacks disproportionately come from single-parent
families, whose income will usually be lower—despite high educational
and occupational prestige—than otherwise similar two-parent families.”22 Nevertheless, Sander minimizes the potential effect of this flaw,
noting that “none of the data sources [he] know[s] of on the SES of the
general population of law students help us take these factors into account.”23 Yet, a quick review of the data regarding the percentages of
black and white children who live in single-parent households raises serious questions about whether Sander’s analysis in his article can even be
legitimately run without taking such factors in account. First, as Sander
concedes himself, considering that a more accurate predictor of SES
would include all persons in a household who contribute to the expenses,24 Sander’s averaging of SES scores between parents greatly
overstates the SES of single-parent families. Second, and more importantly, Sander’s risk of overstating privilege for single-parent households
in his study is 2.8 times as high for black children as it is for white children.25 After all, black children are significantly more likely to be raised
in single-parent homes than white students—at a rate of 67% versus
24%.26

20. Sander, supra note 1, at 650.
21. Id. at 636–37.
22. Id. at 652.
23. Id.
24. See Malamud, supra note 14, at 1878–79.
25. See Kids Count Data Ctr., Data Across States: Children in Single-Parent Families by
Race (Percent) – 2009, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/
Rankings.aspx?ind=107 (last visited June 08, 2011).
26. Id.
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Similarly, while Sander notes that his “method [may] be too conservative in characterizing the eliteness of law students . . . [because] many
law students’ parents have not just bachelor degrees, but bachelor degrees from very elite schools,”27 he again fails to identify and discuss the
racial implications for such a flaw. Indeed, this flaw is not just likely to
understate the eliteness of law students, but it is specifically more likely
to overstate the eliteness of black law students and consequently understate the differences between the eliteness of black law students and
white law students. Given the significant blatant discrimination in education against the parents and grandparents of today’s black law students,
such law students’ parents are less likely than their white peers to have
bachelor degrees from very elite schools. As one example, racial minority students today have a vastly lower likelihood of benefiting from legacy programs. At Texas A&M University in 2002—a school that no
longer exercises legacy preferences—legacy preferences allowed for the
enrollment of 321 white students who otherwise would not have been
admitted, but only three Blacks and twenty-five Latina/os in this category.28 In fact, Blacks were not permitted admission to Texas A&M University until 1963.29 Similarly, at the University of Virginia, one report in
2003 indicated that 91 percent of the legacy applicants who were accepted on an early-decision basis were white, while only 1.6 percent of
such admits were black, 0.5 percent were Latina/o, and 1.6 percent were
Asian-American.30 At one point in his article, Sander mentions legacy
preferences as a factor that may have a negative impact on low SES students,31 but even then, Sander fails to acknowledge the racial implications of such legacy preferences.
Finally, we contend that Sander’s methodology is flawed with regard to more than just his tools of measurement. In deciding where to
insert “meaningful breaks” as Malamud would term them,32 Professor
Sander has created a misleading heavily weighted high SES scheme. For
example, a female registered nurse is accorded an occupational score of
75 out of 100, which places her in the high SES quartile.33 Yet, such a

27. Sander, supra note 1, at 637.
28. Todd Ackerman, Legislators Slam A&M Over Legacy Admissions, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 4,
2004, at A1, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=200_3722913; see
also Gates Ends Legacy Role in Admissions, BATTALION O NLINE (Jan. 16, 2004),
http://www.thebatt.com/2.8485/gates-ends-legacy-role-in-admissions-1.1207693
(containing
a
statement in which President Robert Gates asserted that “Texas A&M will no longer award points
for legacy in the admissions review process”).
29. Michael King, Naked City: Texas A&M’s Racial Legacy, AUSTIN CHRON. (Jan. 16, 2004),
http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/print?oid=oid%3A193354.
30. Daniel Golden, Family Ties: Preference for Alumni Children in College Admissions
Draws Fire—Policy, Aiding Mainly Whites, Gets Embroiled in Debate Over Affirmative Action—
Critical to Schools’ Donations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at A1.
31. Sander, supra note 1, at 658.
32. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1879.
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placement does not seem to accord with what the average person would
consider high SES. Although there is wide variation in measuring class, 34
the fact that Professor Sander classifies a registered nurse as high SES 35
is striking because one does not even need a bachelor’s degree to become
a registered nurse. Indeed, a female registered nurse without a bachelor’s
degree would not meet the criteria for being middle-class according to
prominent sociologist Thomas Shapiro, who contends that a middle-class
classification according to education requires that at least one person in
the household have a bachelor’s degree.36 By creating such a broad category of high SES persons, Sander undervalues the comparative privilege
of high SES persons by race, considering that Blacks heavily populate
the occupations at the bottom end of that quartile.37 Indeed, Sander’s
misleading SES scheme has far-reaching implications all throughout his
analysis because it relies on groupings that may be inaccurate and lacking in meaning, thus making any comparisons that he makes between the
various racial and class groups unreliable.
Moreover, in comparing the relative representation of racial and socioeconomic groups of law students to the general population, Sander
proceeds as though the groups of minority students and low-SES students
are mutually exclusive of each other. We suspect others will respond
much like we did when reading Sander’s article, asking: “What would
Table 5 look like if the SES groups (even under Sander’s groupings, but
preferably under one that does not classify both registered nurses and
doctors under the same SES group) were divided by both race and
class?” After all, as Sander highlights at a different point in his paper,
“racial minorities are responsible for much of the small amount of SES
diversity we can currently observe in law schools.”38
B. Having Class and What That Means
On top of the specific flaws in Sander’s data lay more general problems with his definitions of class and SES. Throughout his article,
Sander fails to address various concerns that other legal scholars such as
Malamud have raised about the messiness of measuring class and SES
status.
33. Sander, supra note 1, at 636. Professor Sander adapts the CAMSIS scale, which ranks
occupations, but adds his own percentile to it reasoning that “75% of employed women in this age
cohort have lower CAMSIS codes, so registered nurses are assigned a percentile of 75.” Id.
34. THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 87 (2004).
35. Sander, supra note 1, at 636.
36. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 88.
37. Id. at 89 (“The gap between whites and blacks grows using the occupational definition of
the middle class because it does not have an income ceiling and thus includes proportionally more
well-to-do families, and highly paid professionals and executives tend to be white. Conversely,
employees in lower-middle-jobs—office workers, civil servants, and salespeople—are disproportionately black.”).
38. Sander, supra note 1, at 651.
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1. The Difficulties of Defining Class/SES
In several articles, Malamud has undertaken a comprehensive look
at the inherent difficulties in devising a technically, morally, and culturally accurate class-based affirmative action program.39 In so doing, she
has urged a structural, intergenerational approach to understanding economic disadvantage, one that is cognizant of the limitations of most traditional indicia used to estimate economic disadvantage and that considers the intertwinement of race, gender, and class oppressions.40 For example, Malamud asserts the following about defining and understanding
class in the United States:
Class is social in the dual sense that the class system is inherent in
and perpetuated by the structure of economic relations in the society
and that shared class position has the potential for being mobilized as
the basis for both group identity and political action. Class is diachronic in the triple sense that class position is (1) intergenerationally
transmitted, (2) mediated through the strategic behavior of social actors over time, and (3) incapable of being understood without reference to patterns of change in the economic organization of the society.
Finally, there is an alternative version of a belief in class, which
builds on the meaning of class just described, but goes beyond it. In
this view, class is said to interact with race, gender, and ethnicity
(and perhaps other elements of social identity, such as place of residence) in interlocking and mutually defining structures, and it is their
interaction that is seen to shape both consciousness and life chances.
One of the many consequences of this view, if it is correct, is that
class analysis can never be race- or gender-blind and therefore cannot
strictly be viewed as an alternative to the traditional foci of antidis41
crimination law and policy.

Overall, Malamud suggests that, although the various elements of
economic advantage are structurally intertwined, and all are needed to
present a full picture, institutions can consider wealth, occupation, income, education, consumption, and class consciousness (as well as race,
gender, and ethnicity) in determining whether applicants should be the
recipients of class-based affirmative action.42 At the same time, however,
Malamud acknowledges and explains the individual limitations and advantages of each of these elements. For example, in describing wealth,
she argues that, despite its ability to represent true inequality that is directly related to the availability of opportunities and its revelation of
stark racial inequality, wealth is rarely revealed or utilized in studies.43
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 14.
Id. at 1855–56.
Id.
Id. at 1870–85.
Id. at 1870–72.
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She further notes that occupational status demonstrates the intergenerational nature of class and its lack of mobility, but points out that there is
not an agreed upon set of characteristics to classify occupations and that
job titles may not represent true duties or prestige.44
Thereafter, Malamud explains that, in contrast to wealth, while income data is easily attainable and measurable, it makes economic mobility seem more accessible than it actually is.45 Furthermore, she points out
that income is not accurately conveyed when given individually, but is
more truly representative of SES when presented in the aggregate form
for a family or household.
Related to that, Malamud explicates that measuring class by educational status is a catch-22 because, although it is a significant indicator of
opportunities available to a child, the complexity (such as the reputation
of the school, the type of degree, whether the program is a night or day
program) of education level cannot easily be taken into consideration,
resulting in persons with less socially valued forms of education seeming
more privileged than they actually are.46 Likewise, she notes that consumption is a defining characteristic of class in American society, but
that context dictates the importance of it, making, for example, a rural
family’s consumption patterns difficult to compare to persons in urban
areas.47
Finally, Malamud warns of expecting students to have a shared
class consciousness and to be willing and able to discuss a disadvantaged
perspective based on class because many students—particularly by the
graduate level—may lack a strong connection to their lower class roots.48
In considering such elements of economic disadvantage, she also states
that decisions must be made regarding how to classify a person’s disadvantage: gradationally, categorically, or relationally.49 Furthermore, she
contends, a decision must be made on (1) whose class should be measured: that of an individual, a family, a household; (2) how to define a
household; (3) how many generations should be included; and (4) how to
treat children with parents in different households.50 Malamud argues
that the most accurate way to gain an understanding of economic advantage is by looking at the household as a whole, but also importantly notes
that the economic advantages of grandparents may be outcome determinative of a child’s life opportunities.51

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1872–77.
Id. at 1877–80.
Id. at 1880–83.
Id. at 1883–85.
Id. at 1885–88.
Id. at 1863–65.
Id. at 1866–68.
Id. at 1866–69.
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2. Acknowledging What’s Missing in Sander’s Measures of Socioeconomic Status
In his article, Sander never grapples with any of the complexities of
class that Malamud astutely lays out, choosing instead to rely on a more
simplified definition. As a result, Sander fails to tell a complete story of
SES.
Overall, Sander claims to be measuring SES, but he never takes into
consideration that racial status is highly important in American society,
conferring both social and economic benefits and detriments. In fact, he
seems to suggest that race itself comes with no disadvantages.52 His failure to adjust for the disparate racial impact of certain tools for measuring
SES renders racial inequality invisible. Of particular significance is
Sander’s unnecessary averaging of family household SES data (as noted
in Part I.A),53 his exclusion of income data in relation to occupations,54
and most starkly, his lack of data on wealth, which would more fully
complete the stories about intergenerational wealth.55 The true SES of
many black families is much lower than Sander emphasizes,56 thus
greatly destabilizing his argument that high-SES blacks are being unfairly advantaged over low-SES whites.
First, Sander’s determinants of SES lack income, which, in relation
to occupation, renders pay differentials within occupations invisible. A
person may hold a job within an occupation in the public sector or the
private sector, the former which, on average, pays less.57 Considering
Blacks are more heavily represented in the public sector as civil servants,58 their SES is likely overstated by not including the income commensurate to the occupation, rendering any income disparity invisible.59
But even more significant than Sander’s exclusion of income determinants60 is his failure to account for and analyze wealth.61 While the
average income gap between black families and white families has nar52. See generally Sander, supra note 1 (centering his analysis around socioeconomic rather
than racial diversity).
53. Id. at 636.
54. Id. at 633–36.
55. Id. at 652 (recognizing that wealth is important and that there is likely a racial disparity).
56. Although Professor Sander recognizes that the measures are likely to overstate the wealth
of Blacks, he denies that such flaws significantly or fatally affect his classifications. See id. (recognizing that the SES of Blacks is likely to be overstated).
57. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 89 (stating that Blacks are more likely to be civil servants who
earn less, situating themselves as lower middle-class).
58. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1893.
59. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 89 (discussing the problem with occupation classifications
when there is no income cap, which places clerical workers and executives in the same category
despite great variance in economic advantage).
60. Id. at 36 (“Income is an indicator of the current status of racial inequality . . . wealth
discloses the consequences of the racial patterning of opportunities.”).
61. Sander, supra note 1, at 650–53 (recognizing that wealth is important and that there is
likely a racial disparity).
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rowed to 64 cents to every dollar,62 the racial wealth gap is much
greater.63 The impact of the legacy of racial oppression is evident by
looking at the difference in wealth: “[B]lack families possess only 10
cents for every dollar of wealth held by white families.”64 Although the
exact spread of the racial wealth gap varies, “[w]hite households in every
income quintile have significantly higher median wealth than similarearning black households.”65
The source of the wealth gap is not fully explained by factors such
as income,66 education, or job status—any of the traditional measures of
class status.67 The racial wealth gap’s lack of correlation to traditional
measures of class is illustrated by the finding that, if wealth is used as the
measure “black families headed by professionals like doctors and lawyers would be in the same class as white families headed by blue-collar
workers, such as coal miners.”68 Considering that more merit-based differences such as “education, jobs, and earnings” do not explain the racial
wealth gap, it must be explained by non-merit-based sources such as
“inheritance, institutional discrimination, and discriminatory public policy.”69
This story of wealth is not one that can be or should be ignored
when we are talking about class and SES distinctions in the affirmative
action context. With regard to inheritance, white parents give funds to
children earlier and in greater amounts.70 In his rather revealing book,
The Hidden Cost of Being African American, sociologist Thomas Shapiro
discusses the power of intergenerational wealth on racial inequality by
discussing the prevalence of “transformative assets,” which serve as “inherited wealth lifting a family beyond their own achievements.”71 Transformative assets include “down payments and closing costs for first-time
homebuyers, college tuition payments, large cash gifts, and loans, as well
as old-fashioned bequests at death.”72

62. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 7 (noting that the gap had narrowed following 1989 figures
which found that a black family made only 55 cents for every dollar a white family made).
63. Id. at 32–33.
64. Id. at 47 (“The net worth of typical white families is $81,000 compared to $8,000 for
black families.”).
65. Id. at 49.
66. Id. at 88–89 (stating that his study corroborated prior findings that income does not predict wealth levels).
67. Id. at 87.
68. Id. at 92.
69. Id. at 42.
70. Id. at 67–69. With respect to gifts from living family members, blacks and whites are just
as likely to receive at all levels of wealth but “[t]he gift for the average white recipient was $2,824,
compared to $805 for black families,” and “[b]lack families are just as willing to help their adult
children, but their circumstances limit their ability to do so.” Id. at 68. Additionally, “among those
fortunate enough to receive bequests, blacks received 8 cents of inheritance for every dollar inherited
by whites.” Id. at 69.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Id.
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Similarly, institutional discrimination and policy have played an
enormous role in racial wealth differences that affect educational opportunities. For example, as a result of post-World War II governmental
policies and societal trends, the modern middle-class was built. In fact,
many middle-class white families were able to establish wealth through
greater education and homeownership as a result of these policies and
now are routinely able to leave their children inheritances as a result of
these benefits.73 Following World War II, the Federal Housing Administration created policies that facilitated homeownership for the masses,
and the GI Bill and Veterans Administration’s home loans provided veterans financial assistance for gaining an education and buying a home. 74
However, these policies precede the 1968 Fair Housing Act.75 Thus,
when Whites were seizing government-provided opportunities, Blacks
were blocked from capitalizing on them due to homeowners’ refusals to
sell, banks’ refusals to give mortgages to Blacks or in black neighborhoods, and the simple exclusion of Blacks from such housing and educational programs.76
The modern wave of increased homeownership was not the first
major governmental housing policy that overwhelmingly benefited white
families. In 1862, the federal government passed the Homestead Act,
which gave out 160 acres of “free”77 land for people to raise a family,
build wealth, and create opportunities for their children.78 Some estimates calculate that a quarter of the white adult American population is a
descendant of a Homestead Act recipient and thus a beneficiary of a racially exclusive federal housing policy.79 All the while, black Americans
never received their forty acres and a mule or a comparable tool to build
wealth following the end of slavery.
Even current housing policy benefits the families of wealth-rich
persons and yields to racial discrimination and racist consumer preferences. For example, current housing policy requires new homebuyers to
make a down payment of 20% of the home price.80 By paying such a
great portion of the home price, a person avoids paying private mortgage
insurance (which is equivalent to approximately 0.75 percent of the loan)
73. Id. (“In fact, as a result of the tremendous postwar economic prosperity and public policies promoting middle-class homeownership, today inheritances are commonplace for middle-class
families.”).
74. Id. at 190.
75. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619).
76. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 108–09; see also Census Report: Broad Racial Disparities
Persist, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 14, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15704759/ns/us_
news-life/.
77. By “free,” we mean that the land was given without to the exchange of money from the
recipients.
78. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 190.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 111–12.
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and secures a lower interest rate.81 Steep initial prices provide great barriers to homeownership for those with college debts and parents who do
not offer to pay all or a significant portion of the down payment—in
other words, those without access to transformative assets.82 Upon acquiring adequate funds to buy a home, racial discrimination in securing a
mortgage often results in a barrier, if not complete, at least a higher cost
barrier.83 Consistently, black families with similar credentials to white
families are rejected; one study showed that lending institutions deny
Blacks home loans eighty percent more often than similarly situated
Whites.84 And, overall, Blacks’ interest rates are 0.3% higher than
Whites.85
Finally, upon securing a home, black families (living in areas that
are more than ten percent black) find that their home equity does not
appreciate at near the same level as if they lived in a nearly all white
neighborhood.86 Their home value appreciates at an 18% lower rate than
homes in white neighborhoods, because by and large, Whites will not
buy a home in a black neighborhood.87 Therefore, the demand for a home
in a black neighborhood is limited to black families (and possibly other
minorities) who have the requisite funding, rather than the entire population, including Whites, who have a greater ability to buy homes.88 Thus,
the primary source of wealth—homeownership89 and home equity—
accrue to black homeowners at a significantly lower rate, which in turn
limits the quality of the schools in those areas as well as the assets that
families can further provide to their children.90
The impact of intergenerational wealth, which has accrued and continues to grow as a result of discriminatory practices and policies, demonstrates that, although strides in education and income are improving
81. Id. at 112.
82. Id. at 111–19 (describing the vast difference in help securing the down payment for first
homes between black and white families).
83. Id. at 111.
84. Id. at 109–10.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Id. at 120–21.
87. Id. at 122 (“The pool of potential buyers is no longer 100 percent of the affordable market,
because for all practical purposes potential white buyers shun such neighborhoods. The potential
buyers are now mainly other black Americans who can afford the home and possibly other minorities.” (footnote omitted)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 43 (“[F]or families in the middle three-fifths of America’s net worth distribution,
ranging from $1,650 to $153,000, equity in their principal residence represents 60 percent of their
wealth.”).
90. Id. at 53 (“Everything else being equal, blacks accrue only $1.98 in wealth for each additional dollar earned, in comparison to $3.25 for whites, so that, net of all other factors, the average
black family earning $60,000 possesses $76,000 less wealth than the average white family with the
same earnings. The most dramatic difference is the wealth effect of homeownership, which is worth
about $60,000 more for whites than blacks. The evidence bolsters my core argument that the way
homes are bought and sold, where they are located, and how the market values them provides a
contemporary foundation for racial inequality.”).
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the current reality for some black Americans, many Blacks are left in the
dust compared to their white counterparts who are able to maintain and
raise their social status91 precisely because of racial advantage in a variety of forms.92 Plain and simple, white students are statistically more
likely to have already received greater opportunities from their families
and are more likely to receive greater future opportunities by utilizing
wealth that is unparalleled among Blacks.93
In fact, research on students at twenty-eight elite undergraduate institutions—the very kinds of institutions that serve as feeder schools for
law schools—reveals that these institutions’ multiracial students, black
immigrant students, and especially black American students with long
term roots in the United States (otherwise known as legacy Blacks 94) are
significantly disadvantaged in terms of various SES indicators when
compared to their white peers at the same elite institutions. For example:
Recent findings from a study of students at twenty-eight colleges and
universities reveal that, while only seventy percent of fathers of [immigrant] Blacks and 55.2 percent of fathers of legacy Blacks were
college graduates, 85.7 percent of white first-year students were college graduates; similarly, while only 43.6 percent of the fathers of
[immigrant] Blacks and 25.3 percent of the fathers of legacy Blacks
had advanced degrees, 56.7 percent of the white fathers in the group
95
had advanced degrees.

91. Id. at 10 (“Many of the families I spoke to relied on transformative assets to acquire their
class standing, social status, homeownership, the kind of community they live in, and their children’s
schooling.”).
92. Id. at 13 (“Many whites continue to reap advantages from the historical, institutional,
structural, and personal dynamics of racial inequality, and they are either unaware of these advantages or deny they exist. Black Americans in particular pay a very steep tax for this uneven playing
field and outcome, as well as for the denial of white advantage.”); see also id. at 114 (“In effect,
young white families possess an advantage in housing markets and homeownership because their
parents’ economic livelihoods and ability to accumulate wealth were untrammeled by race in previous generations.”).
93. Id. at 40 (“A further analysis of this already disturbing data discloses imposing and powerful racial and ethnic cleavages. In 1999, 26 percent of all white children grew up in asset-poor
households, compared to 52 percent of black American children and 54 percent of Hispanic children.”).
94. The term “legacy Blacks” applies to African-Americans who come from families in which
all four grandparents descend from black American slaves. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at
1149 n.27.
95. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1190 (citing Douglas S. Massey et al., Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United States, 113
AM. J. EDUC. 243, 257 tbl.3 (2007)); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., THE SOURCE OF THE
RIVER: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FRESHMEN AT AMERICA’S SELECTIVE COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES 30–31 tbl.2.5 (2003). Among the schools included in the study were the following (in
alphabetical order): Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Columbia University, Denison University, Emory University, Georgetown University, Howard University, Kenyon College, Miami University-Oxford, Northwestern University, Oberlin College, Pennsylvania State University, Princeton
University, Rice University, Smith College, Stanford University, Swarthmore College, Tufts University, Tulane University, University of California-Berkeley, University of Michigan, University of
North Carolina, University of Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania, Washington University in
St. Louis, Wesleyan University, Williams College, and Yale University.
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Admittedly, these statistics reveal a generally more privileged group in
the United States as a whole, but such racial differences in educational
attainment among this more privileged group stand separate and apart
from the eliteness of the schools attended by the students’ fathers, a factor, which for the reasons described in Part I.A., are far more likely to
slant in favor of white students.96
Additionally, the same study of twenty-eight elite institutions revealed that black students at these schools were more likely than their
white peers to come from families that were earning less as middleincome families and that black students also were more likely than their
white peers to be experiencing many of the factors related to coming
from poverty. Specifically, the study showed “that only 23.8 percent of
black immigrant families and 25.5 percent of African-American families” with students at the elite institutions “had an income over $100,000
as compared to 52.9 percent of white families, for whom fewer mothers
were working outside of the home.”97 Furthermore, “whereas 15.7 percent of the black immigrant families and 19.5 percent of the AfricanAmerican families in the twenty-eight college study had ever been on
welfare, only 5.3 percent of the white families had ever been on welfare.”98
Lastly, studies show that black and white students experience significantly different advantages with regard to homeownership, a fact that
should come as no surprise given Shapiro’s accounting of institutional
and attitudinal discrimination against Blacks in housing. For example,
the same “study of the black and white students at select elite colleges
revealed that, while only 71.4 percent of black immigrant families and
73.7 percent” of legacy Black families in the study “owned a house as
opposed to renting (a relatively elite group compared to average American families), 93.8 percent of white families owned one.”99 Second, and
more importantly, the study showed that, even among this elite group,
Blacks were at a significant disadvantage in terms of wealth through
assets, as the average value of the homes for the black immigrant families was $220,600 and the average value of the homes for the legacy
Black families was $193,200 compared to the average value of the
homes for the white families at $327,400, a difference of more than
$100,000–$130,000 for both groups.100

96. See supra Part I.A.
97. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1190–91 (citation omitted); see also Dorothy A.
Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1469, 1501 (1997) (highlighting that black married couples are more likely to be equal wage
earners).
98. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1191–92 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 1192 (citation omitted).
100. Id.
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Such stark differentials in wealth indicated by these studies as well
as the research by Shapiro and others on intergenerational wealth demonstrate that Sander’s attempts to compare occupation- and educationindicated, high-SES Black persons to high-SES White persons without
any consideration of real wealth distorts the reality of societal advantage
and privilege and thus distorts the results of such studies.
II. WHAT ’S RACE GOT TO DO WITH IT ? A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
SANDER’S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST RACE-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In addition to our concerns about Sander’s measures of class and SES,
we also have several substantive responses to Sander’s push to replace
race-based affirmative action with class-based affirmative action. Apart
from the practical reasons presented above, there are numerous policy
reasons why Sander’s proposal to do away with race-based affirmative
action lacks merit. Specifically, we respond to Sander’s misunderstanding of the benefits of diversity, his failure to recognize the raced implications of “neutral” admissions criteria, and his underestimation of the effects of contemporary racism.
A. Understanding Race, Grutter, and the Benefits of Diversity
As an initial matter, we believe that Sander misunderstands the
benefits of diversity in articulating his arguments for class-based affirmative action and against race-based affirmative action. To begin, by alleging that law schools pay little attention to the actual diversity contributions of students of color,101 Sander misses the objective of race-based
affirmative action. The purpose is not to expose white students to the
minority opinion.102 The purpose is to break down racial barriers between
students, reduce stereotypes, and create enhanced learning as a result of
cross-racial interactions.103 Such results help white students, who have
likely lived highly racially segregated lives,104 to learn that there is not
one minority opinion (and vice versa).105 Furthermore, a critical mass of
racial minorities improves minority students’ educational experience
because it allows individual students to hold less of the burden (that
white students do not have) to educate inquisitive and unknowing white

101.
102.
103.
104.

Sander, supra note 1, at 665–56.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
Id. at 330.
SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 143 (referencing GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE:
CONSEQUENCES OF A D ECADE OF RESEGREGATION 34 (2001)) (“A recent study on school segregation reports that ‘white students are by far the most segregated in schools dominated by their own
group.’ Whites on average go to schools where 80 percent of the students are white. In comparison,
blacks and Latinos attend schools where a little over half of the students are black or Latino.”)
105. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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classmates about race106 and allows minority students to focus on their
own education.
The interest in breaking down stereotypes through a critical mass of
racial diversity continues to provide public benefits long after students
graduate. Multinational firms support race-based affirmative action because they desire a well-educated workforce that includes employees of
all races who, through prior exposure to diversity, have an ease and familiarity with working in diverse groups.107 Moreover, major corporations and the military have expressed a great need for a well-educated,
racially diverse workforce.108 This is due in part to the finding that heterogeneous workgroups produce better outputs.109
This interest in breaking down stereotypes and creating a robust exchange of ideas is not furthered by the presence of low-SES students,
that is, if we accept Professor Sander’s emphasis on characteristics that
distinguish low-income students from students of color. Indeed, we take
issue with several of Sander’s problematic arguments for why classbased affirmative action is better than race-base affirmative action: his
arguments that students who receive class-based preferences can remain
invisible, are less likely to be stigmatized, “may not even be aware that
they have received a preference,” and are less likely to engage in “group
self-segregation.”110
First, Sander’s argument that the ability to remain invisible is a
benefit of class-based affirmative action111 is tantamount to arguing that
black racial passing as white is a healthy act with no psychological or
material consequences. The very point and benefit of diversity, including
class or SES diversity, is that students see, hear, acknowledge, accept,
and embrace differences and learn from each other by listening to and
respecting the views of others whose opinions and analyses may differ
from their own because of differing backgrounds and life experiences.
Because economic background can be invisible, and students are not
readily identifying themselves as low-SES as Sander claims and Malamud warns,112 there is not as great of a broadening of perspective introduced by low-SES students. It follows that having a critical mass of invisible low-income students in the class would not, based on Sander’s
arguments, help to challenge stereotypes or facilitate better interpersonal
skills. Furthermore, even now with race-based affirmative action, “no
106. Id. at 319 (discussing the impact of having a critical mass of racial minority students in
that it allows students to not feel obligated to serve as racial spokespersons).
107. See id. at 330–31.
108. See id. (citing the amici from the business and military community in support of racebased affirmative action).
109. See id. at 330.
110. Sander, supra note 1, at 665–66.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also Malamud, supra note 14, at 1886–88.
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one can readily tell which [students] have received a preference.”113 That
some students think they can or, worse, assume that all black students
must have benefited from a preference is not an issue that we should shy
away from, but rather challenge. As educators, it is fair to say we have a
responsibility to teach students not to paint all members of a group with a
broad brush of stereotypes simply based on their racial background.
Second, as one study conducted by Professors Angela OnwuachiWillig, Emily Houh, and Mary Campbell has shown, racial minorities do
not feel stigmatized by affirmative action, either internally or externally.114 The findings of another study by Professor Deirdre Bowen fall
in line with the Onwuachi-Willig, Houh, and Campbell study about the
stigma argument.115 Thus, contrary to what Sander asserts, the stigma
argument does not necessarily hold water. Even if the stigma argument
does carry weight, it is not admissions preferences per se that stigmatize
students, but rather the negative stereotypes and associations that attach
to students’ identity groups that stigmatize. As Erving Goffman’s theory
of stigma explicates, stigma is both a precondition to and consequence of
being a “non-normal”—where “normal” status is defined and perpetuated
by the very privileges, social and otherwise, that attached to such
status.116 The stigmatized individual is one who “possesses . . . an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated.”117 For example, Onwuachi-Willig, Houh, and Campbell found in their study that groups that
were not negatively stereotyped within the educational context, such as
Asian Pacific Americans, were not presumed by student subjects to benefit from affirmative action, even in cases where they were actually included in affirmative action programs.118 Or as Professor Christopher
Bracey has explained, students are only “stigmatized” by affirmative
action if their racial group is already generally stigmatized in that manner
in society; the actual facts do not matter.119
More so, we, as an academic legal community that relies so heavily
on factors such as the LSAT, stigmatize students with our words and
113. Sander, supra note 1, at 666.
114. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Emily Houh & Mary Campbell, Cracking the
Egg: Which Came First—Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2008)
(finding that “1) minimal, if any, internal stigma felt by minority law students, regardless of whether
their schools practiced race-based affirmative action; 2) no statistically significant difference in
internal stigma between minority students at affirmative action law schools and non-affirmative
action law schools; and 3) no significant impact from external stigma”).
115. See Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1198–99, 1223–25 (2010) (“Underrepresented minority students in states that permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal and
external stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states.”).
116. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2–5
(1963).
117. Id. at 5.
118. Onwuachi-Willig, Houh & Campbell, supra note 112, at 1344–45.
119. Christopher A. Bracey, Getting Back to Basics: Some Thoughts on Dignity, Materialism,
and a Culture of Racial Equality, 26 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15, 39 (2006).
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rhetoric about deservingness based on LSAT scores (which Sander never
acknowledges as a factor in favor of high-SES students).120 Consider this
one true story, a story which we are confident other minority law professors, low-SES law professors, or minority and low-SES professors could
recount.
Law students at an institution are engaged in intense debates about
rankings and admissions. During this debate, a white, low-SES student
approaches a minority law professor to discuss the discussions within the
law school. He feels conflicted. The white, male student knows that he
had among the lowest, or perhaps the lowest, LSAT score of any student
in the law school. He has performed well in law school and wants to contest the validity of the LSAT to his classmates. He knows that he belongs
in the law school. He also wants to respond to attacks on minority students as the persons responsible for lower rankings. He knows that people are attributing low scores to minority law students that he himself and
another white friend had. He wonders whether he should out himself. In
fact, he never does. He never speaks out. He remains silent.
Contrary to what Sander thinks, it was not any preference that this
low-SES, white student received that made him feel stigmatized. Internally, he knew that he had earned his spot. He also did not feel any external stigma, as he felt no burden from students’ doubts about him or
mistreatment of him; in fact, no students doubted him precisely because
he is white. What made him feel stigmatized, if anything, was the rhetoric about who belonged based on LSAT scores. More than its revelation
about stigma, this student’s story highlights the problems with Sander’s
identification of invisibility as a positive. Because this low-SES, white
student could remain invisible, his classmates never had the opportunity
to learn from him in a way that could have challenged their blind acceptance of the factors currently used during law school admissions processes.
Additionally, Sander’s point about group self-segregation is just
plain disturbing.121 Ask any random, racially mixed group of law school
graduates from a predominantly white institution who their closest
friends from law school are, and you will likely find that the racial minority students have the more diverse group of law school friends; white
law students are more likely to have a group of close friends who also are
white. The fact is that racial minority students at predominantly white
institutions cannot self-segregate. It is impossible to function within a
predominantly white law school as a minority student and not interact
with students of different races. That students of color may eat lunch
together or have a party together is not group self-segregation, that is,
120.
121.

See infra Part II.B.
See Sander, supra note 1, at 666–67.
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unless one also wants to identify the all-white lunch tables and all-white
parties, too, as group self-segregation. Unfortunately, the only time that
racial groups seem to bother people in school settings is when it is minority students who are together. Very few people ever question the allwhite tables or all-whites groups that are surrounding the minority tables
or group or having their own parties.122 That Sander would identify group
self-segregation as an argument against race-based affirmative action
only highlights the importance of racial diversity among both the students and the faculty, as minority students and faculty are more likely to
impart these important lessons about double standards in looking around
at “segregated” groups to their white peers.
Finally, we respond to Sander’s argument that low-SES students are
worthier beneficiaries of affirmative action because their level of disadvantage is more accurately determinable than that of black students because class status more fully conveys privilege than skin color.123 As one
example of his point, Sander points to the overrepresentation of first and
second generation black students from Africa and the Caribbean at colleges and universities, asserting that multiracial students and black African and Caribbean immigrants should be considered demographically
distinct from black descendants of American slaves124 (referred to as
legacy Blacks 125 or ascendants).126
First, we reject Sander’s contention that low-SES students are worthier beneficiaries of affirmative action than minority students because
their disadvantage is more determinable. It is a misnomer to state that
SES preferences are based on individual circumstances, whereas race is
based on group membership; thus, the former are more just.127 SES preferences are based on group membership in that one does not have to
show that she ever actually suffered from being in that class. In that way,
race is also based on group membership. In order to be based on individual circumstances, people would need to show that they individually
have been harmed by low-SES.

122. See BEVERLY D ANIEL TATUM, “WHY ARE A LL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN
CAFETERIA?” AND O THER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 52 (1997) (discussing how questions
regarding seating at lunch tables are generally framed).
123. Sander, supra note 1, at 664–66.
124. Id. at 665.
125. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1148–49.
126. Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the
Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational Institutions,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1236 (2008) (defining such persons as “ascendants” in order to emphasize
“blacks’ ascendancy out of chattel slavery and segregation” as well as limit persons in the category
to those that “personally experienced America’s racially discriminatory history their entire lives or
were born from parents who were generally considered black at the time that affirmative action
policies were first adopted . . . a product . . . of analyzing affirmative action from its inception from
the perspective of the historical struggle undertaken by the black community to overcome its racial
oppression in the United States”).
127. Sander, supra note 1, at 664.
THE
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But, while we do not agree with Sander’s larger point about who is
a “worthier” affirmative action beneficiary, we do agree that groups of
black students should be distinctly considered based on national origin
and interraciality due in part to the fact that multiracial students and
black immigrants generally tend to have greater privilege than legacy
Blacks.128 We also agree that the presence of multiracial students and
black immigrants in elite law schools when classified as simply “black”
overestimates the presence of legacy Blacks.129 Finally, we contend that
it is important, especially for remedial purposes, to ensure that racial
diversity includes greater numbers of legacy Blacks.130
However, we do not think that law schools should exclude multiracial and black immigrant students from their race-based affirmative action plans. Because racial stereotypes of black people do not entirely
exclude multiracial and black immigrant people,131 many of the interests
served by including legacy Blacks in race-based affirmative action plans
also are furthered by the presence of multiracial and black immigrant
students.132 Indeed, race-based affirmative action for legacy Blacks is
supported in part because it counteracts the external and internal factors
that hinder the success of affirmative action beneficiaries (such as race
discrimination and stereotype threat, respectively). Because multiracial
students (if they identify as black or part-black) and black immigrant
students are often subject to the same stereotypes as legacy Blacks, they
also are at risk of suffering the effects of race discrimination and stereotype threat.133 Furthermore, while some black immigrants, particularly
first generation, voluntary immigrants, do not tend to suffer from stereotype threat, voluntary black immigrants and their descendants are not
forever exempt from bearing the weight of the effects of societal antiblack discrimination; while black immigrants are often able to proceed
successfully with their goals unencumbered by cultural stereotypes that
often hinder legacy Blacks, the advantage of the immigrant perspective,
which allows them to distance themselves from black American stereotypes as well as compare their situation not to white Americans but to
their life back home, starts to give way after the very first generation.134
Thus, the advantages gained by higher education for black immigrants
128. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1165–79.
129. See id. at 1144–45 (discussing the diverse backgrounds of “Black” students admitted to
law schools); see also Brown & Bell, supra note 124, at 1245 (arguing that the percentage of “Ascendants . . . may be considerably less than many administrators and members of the faculty and
admissions committee realize”).
130. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1162–63.
131. Brown & Bell, supra note 124, at 1241.
132. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1180–1207 (arguing that legacy Blacks, as well as
black immigrants and multiracial students, serve the purposes of race-based affirmative action by
advancing diversity and social justice).
133. Id. at 1187–88.
134. See id. at 1195, 1198 (discussing the impacts of cultural assimilation and stereotypes on
immigrants).
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may not curtail the future detrimental effects of racial stereotypes and
stigma on their descendants.
Moreover, race-based affirmative action, which includes multiracial
and black immigrant students, also benefits Whites. The presence of multiracial and black immigrant students and their interaction with white
students in the classroom may help to counter Whites’ stereotypes of not
only that particular subgroup of Blacks, but Blacks in general. Such an
environment allows Whites to develop greater cultural competence and
become better prepared to work with co-workers from different backgrounds.
Regardless, the current lack of precision in beneficiaries of racebased affirmative action in law school admissions is not a fatal flaw; a
more appropriate approach is to reform race-based affirmative action.
For example, one of us has urged the required inclusion of racial/ancestral heritage background essays in admissions processes for all
applicants. In such an essay, an applicant who is a legacy Black could
describe discrimination that she has faced in American society, and a
black immigrant applicant could describe the challenges in light of her
circumstances.135 Such a procedure would allow an admissions committee to gain a greater understanding of who an applicant is, including her
privileges and disadvantages; the challenges she has personally faced;
how far she has come; and whether her admission will advance the
school’s mission.136
B. Failing to Understand the Racial Implications of “Neutral” Admissions Criteria
In addition to articulating arguments that display a fundamental
misunderstanding of the benefits of diversity, Sander fails to discuss and
critique many important admissions criteria that work to the advantage of
high-SES students and disadvantage of low-SES students. Although
Sander highlights current admissions criteria that slant in favor of highSES students, such as legacy preferences, the lack of accounting for
grade inflation at private colleges, and preferences for “interesting” records,137 he does not acknowledge all of the criteria that can work to disadvantage low-SES students during the law school admissions process,
including rather prominent criteria. One of the most startling omissions
in Sander’s list of factors that negatively impact low-SES students is the
LSAT. That Sander excludes the LSAT itself from a list of items that
may privilege higher-SES students is shocking. Numerous studies reveal
that the results of exams like the LSAT correlate very highly with paren-

135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1220–24.
Id. at 1221–24.
Sander, supra note 1, at 658–59.
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tal income.138 Also, basic common sense would require including the
LSAT on any list of high-SES advantages in the admissions game, given
that the preparation courses that help many students raise their LSAT
scores by an average of 7 points costs over $1,000–$2,000 and that some
students have the privilege of having the resources to hire private tutors
for the LSAT.139 Yet, Sander never discusses the LSAT, which plays a
huge role in the admission process, as one of the disadvantages to lowSES students.
Additionally, Sander attacks the “interesting factor” in admissions
decisions as being anti-low SES, but in so doing, he does not consider
how such a factor may be used to recognize the contributions from
groups that have been historically discriminated against in society.140 The
interesting factor not only may assist racial minorities, but also would
allow white low-SES students to be viewed more holistically and favorably than if the admissions committee considered only LSAT and UGPA.
A broad conceptualization of the interesting factor should not be seen as
an impenetrable barrier for low-SES students, as it may include student
involvement in popular, mainstream activities, such as student government, and non-popular or specialized school and community organizations. In addition to not harming low-SES students, the interesting factor
may allow greater diversity of groups that have been historically discriminated against. Particularly, “interesting factors” may include leadership positions in intercultural organizations such as black student organizations, feminist organizations, and GLBTQ organizations. Activity and
leadership in such groups enriches the campus experience for many and
provides an outlet for minorities and allies of all types to improve a campus they perceive as hostile to their group. Consequently, although the
interesting factor may work to benefit high-SES students whose privileges and connections make Capitol Hill internships or knowing several
languages more likely, such non-standardized criteria also allow other
types of diversity to be taken into consideration that are vital for a wellrounded class and that provide recognition for student involvement that
is local and non-cost prohibitive.
Finally, Sander’s critique of admissions criteria does not acknowledge the role of race in American society. A difference in average LSAT
scores between black and white students does not delegitimize the pres138. See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1630 (2003); see
also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 987–88 (1996) (discussing the relationship

between SAT scores and parental income).
139. Julie A. Helling, Law and Diversity Program: A Model for Attracting, Retaining, and
Preparing Diverse Students for Law School, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 561, 565 (2006) (“[M]any
students take an LSAT preparation course and the typical cost is over $1,000.”); Jerry R. Parkinson,
Admissions After Grutter, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 159, 163 (2003) (“[T]aking an LSAT preparation
course improves an applicant’s score by approximately seven points.”).
140. Sander, supra note 1, at 659–60.
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ence of the group with lower scores, harm the student, or serve as an
accurate indicator of longtime future success. Stating that racial preferences are equivalent to an increase in LSAT score by seven to fifteen
points for Hispanic and Black students, respectively,141 should be considered valid only if the LSAT predicts law school grades, bar passage, and
the ability to practice law and be a citizen lawyer.142 However, the LSAT
does not do that work—the LSAT is intended only to predict first year
grades and is able to do so only at a correlation of 0.40 with a 0.00 being
no correlation, and 1.00 being a perfect correlation.143 Considering that
the LSAT is not a strong predictor of success as a lawyer or even as a
second or third year law student,144 non-GPA and LSAT factors, including race, should not be considered a delegitimizing factor in admissions.
Additionally, it would be telling to see what other factors result in a
boost to traditional measures of credentials. For example, how much of a
LSAT score boost do admitted students whose parents attended that law
school “earn”? While such students would have already received the
social boost of privilege that leads to a higher likelihood of gaining a
higher UGPA and LSAT score, how much would admissions officers
overlook the lower UGPA or LSAT scores of such students?
Not only does a differential in LSAT score not deny a black student’s legitimacy as having earned her spot in the law school class, but it
also does not harm the student due to a “mismatch effect,” which claims
that recipients of race-based affirmative action are given such a great
preference in admissions that it overcompensates for their weak LSAT
scores and UGPAs such that they are incapable of competing with their
white counterparts whose scores are much higher.145 The rates of black
students dropping out of law school, having lower law school GPAs, and
having higher bar failure rates should not be readily attributable to lower
intelligence or preparedness, but rather should be considered a possible
result of racial discrimination and microaggressions encountered by
black students in predominantly white schools.146 Furthermore, black
students may be underperforming on ability tests such as the LSAT, law
141. Id. at 654.
142. See Guinier, supra note 7, at 149 (citing the University of Michigan Law School’s study
which found that “individuals with lower LSAT scores and college grades tended to spend more
time in public or unremunerated legal service” and that “following graduation, the school’s black
and Latino students succeeded in ways that eluded many of their white counterparts whose entrylevel credentials were higher” (footnote omitted)).
143. Stephen P. Klein, Law School Admission, LSATs, and the Bar, ACAD. Q UESTIONS, Winter
2001–02, at 33, 34.
144. Id. at 33 (conceding that “[t]he LSAT is not designed to predict who will be a good (or
otherwise ‘successful’) lawyer”).
145. Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of “A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools”, 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 15
(2005) (stating that the mismatch effect theory is flawed, as “[e]ven when the LSAT scores and
UGPAs of African-American law school students are similar to those of their white peers, black
students do not receive law school grades that are comparable to those of their white counterparts”).
146. Id. at 16–20.
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school exams, and the bar exam, due to pressure that a failure may result
in a perceived stereotype confirmation—a phenomenon known in psychology as “stereotype threat.”147
Even more egregious than Sander’s unquestioned acceptance of the
LSAT as an accurate, unbiased predictor of ability to practice law is his
disregard of the racialized nature of legacy preferences in a country
where de jure access to predominantly white law schools is barely two
generations old. Sander’s reference to legacy preferences as unduly benefiting high-SES students148 should not be seen as race-neutral.149 Legacy
preferences disproportionately benefit white students who are socially
and economically privileged.150 This non-merit based criterion serves as
affirmative action for children of alumni.151 It also has a much greater
likelihood of benefiting white high-SES students due to prior barriers to
education for people of color and a continued lower graduation rate at all
levels of education.152 Legacy preferences are not used to remedy past
discrimination, but rather to maintain the status quo and ensure that their
beneficiaries maintain their family privilege, which was gained in part
through direct and indirect oppression.153 While Sander discounts this
impact as an insignificant factor in law school admissions,154 the recent
scandal at one university, which was reported to include trading admis147. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 808 (1995) (demonstrating
through a series of experiments that when told that a test was measuring a person’s ability, black
students performed worse than if they thought that it did not measure ability and concluding that “the
present experiments show that making African American participants vulnerable to judgment by
negative stereotypes about their group’s intellectual ability depressed their standardized test performance relative to White participants”); see also Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 142, at
20–21 (applying stereotype threat theory to black law students).
148. Sander, supra note 1, at 658.
149. Richard D. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths About Legacy Preferences in College Admissions,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/10-Myths-AboutLegacy/124561/ (discussing legacy preferences at the undergraduate level and stating “legacy preferences continue to disproportionately hurt students of color”); see also supra Part I.A (discussing
Professor Sander’s failure to acknowledge the racial implications of legacy preferences).
150. Kahlenberg, supra note 147 (discussing how underrepresented minorities make up “only
6.7 percent of the legacy-applicant pool” at selective colleges and universities as compared to 12.5%
of the total applicant pool).
151. Id. (discussing the fact that “being a legacy increased one’s chance of admission to a
selective institution by 19.7 percentage points”).
152. Id. (“Moreover, this disparate impact is likely to extend far into the future. In 2008, African-Americans and Latinos made up more than 30 percent of the traditional college-aged population
but little more than 10 percent of the enrollees at the U.S. News’s top 50 national universities.”); see
also SARAH R. CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL A TTAINMENT IN THE U NITED
STATES: 2007 U.S. CENSUS CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 4–5 (2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p20-560.pdf (providing high school diploma attainment rates
for native, non-immigrants, as follows: 89.6% of non-Hispanic whites, 80% of Blacks, 76.5% of
Hispanics of any race; and providing Bachelor degree attainment rates as follows: 30.1% of nonHispanic Whites, 16.2% of Blacks, and 15.9% of Hispanic of any race).
153. Kahlenberg, supra note 147 (“Because they disproportionately benefit whites, legacy
preferences reduce, rather than enhance, racial and ethnic diversity in higher education. And rather
than being a remedy for discrimination, they were born of discrimination. . . . They explicitly classify individuals by bloodline and do so in a way that compounds existing hierarchy.”).
154. Sander, supra note 1, at 654–55.

832

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:4

sions for the children of politically powerful people in exchange for jobs
for current students155 coupled with the statistics that show that the rate
of white legacy admits at elite undergraduate institutions is often at least
ten times that of non-white legacy admits, should raise questions.156 The
role of parental connections, whether it be as an alumni or a politically
well-connected person, should not be overlooked as a possible racial
barrier to law school admissions.157
Finally, as the work of Professors Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris
demonstrates, the required exclusion of race from the law school admissions process is not race-neutral and, in fact, negatively impacts racial
minorities, creating a new racial preference for Whites.158 As Carbado
and Harris ask, what does it mean to ask a racial minority student, for
whom race has been central to her life experience, to write a personal
statement without any reference to race? As Carbado and Harris explain:
This incentive structure is likely to be particularly costly to applicants
for whom race is a central part of their social experience and sense of
identity. The problem is compounded by the fact that the life story of
many people—particularly with regard to describing disadvantage—
simply does not make sense without reference to race. Consequently,
should these applicants attempt to transcribe their experiences in
race-neutral terms, they risk that they will be disadvantaged because
their lives will be unintelligible to admissions officials and unrecog159
nizable to themselves.

C. Recognizing That Contemporary Racism Supports the Need to Maintain Race-Based Affirmative Action In Order to Achieve Racial Diversity
Contrary to Sander’s assertion that the elimination of race-based affirmative action would not affect racial diversity if replaced by classbased affirmative action,160 several studies show that class-based affirmative action results in lower racial diversity, particularly lower black student enrollment. This was evident with regard to Sander’s university,
155. See Jodi S. Cohen et al., U. of I. Jobs-for-Entry Scheme, CHI. TRIB. (June 26, 2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-ui-trustees-26-jun26,0,3541380.story; Lee A. Daniels, ‘Clout U.’: The Admissions Scandal at the University of Illinois, DEFENDERS ONLINE (Sept. 29,
2009),http://www.thedefendersonline.com/2009/09/29/%E2%80%98clout-u-%E2%80%99-theadmissions-scandal-at-the-university-of-illinois.
156. Kahlenberg, supra note 147 (“At Texas A&M, 321 of the legacy admits in 2002 were
white, while only three were black and 25 Hispanic. At Harvard, only 7.6 percent of legacy admits in
2002 were underrepresented minorities, compared with 17.8 percent of all students. At the University of Virginia, 91 percent of early-decision legacy admits in 2002 were white, 1.6 percent black,
and 0.5 percent Hispanic.”).
157. The impact of the scandal on racial minorities is unclear, but considering that Whites hold
most positions of political power, it is likely to disproportionately help them.
158. See generally Devon Y. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 1139 (2008).
159. Id. at 1148 (footnote omitted).
160. Sander, supra note 1, at 664.

2011]

CLASS, CLASSES, AND CLASSIC RACE-BAITING

833

UCLA School of Law, following Proposition 209.161 Sander’s reference
to maintained racial diversity at UCLA School of Law after Proposition
209162 was not a clear win for all racial minorities, considering that almost all of the diversity consisted of two-thirds white and one-third
Asian American students, with a great decrease in enrollment of Latino163 and black students.164 Interestingly, the greatest direct losers in
removing race-based affirmative action were black Americans, who are
the primary intended beneficiaries of race-based affirmative action.
While low-SES white students may suffer from economic disadvantage, they gain great benefits from white privilege. Proposing to replace
race-based affirmative action with class-based affirmative action will
shift the beneficiaries of affirmative action to white low-SES applicants
due to the sheer greater number of poor white students than poor students
of color. By failing to note the privileges and disadvantages that low-SES
white students and high-SES black students have, Sander paints an incomplete picture. As discussed before, high-SES Blacks may have a
greater amount of income than low-SES whites, but they may not be
anywhere close to equals when it comes to wealth. Additionally, Blacks
are still disadvantaged by their race, which serves generally to advantage
Whites.
In sum, race and class are not equal forms of status. Being a racial
minority is not the same disadvantage as being low-SES. Unlike race,
which often carries physical, immutable characteristics,165 white students
from low-SES backgrounds are able to makeover themselves in order to
render their background near invisible to outsiders, especially by graduate school.166 While attempts at passing (which we do not advocate) as
economically privileged may be discovered,167 passing in and of itself is
far more attainable for the majority of economically disadvantaged
Whites than it is for Blacks. By passing as not economically disadvantaged, students from low-SES backgrounds will not suffer external
stigma for being poor; even if they are “discovered,” they may be admired for exemplifying the power of meritocracy. Furthermore, white
persons from economic disadvantage have not suffered the same pervasive racial discrimination that Blacks have encountered, and continue to
encounter, regardless of class. Blacks of all classes suffer racial oppres161. Id. at 663–64.
162. Id. at 661–64.
163. The authors recognize that the classification “Latino” represents a very large, encompassing ethnic group that is multiracial. However, for the purposes of classifications, many sources use it
as one monolithic group in comparison to multi-ethnic, and in some regards multi-colored racial
groups. As a result, we will not disturb the comparative groups.
164. Sander, supra note 1, at 663–64.
165. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under
Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1103 (2010) (discussing that although race is a social construct, physical markers include not only skin color, but hair texture).
166. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1887.
167. Id.
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sion,168 which can be particularly more harmful for dark-skinned Blacks
than light-skinned Blacks.169
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we perceive numerous defects in Sander’s methodology that raise serious questions about the results in his article Class in
American Legal Education. Even if one accepts all of Sander’s measurements and arguments, the necessary conclusion is not that race-based
affirmative action should be replaced with class-based affirmative action,
but rather that class-based means for ensuring diversity also must be employed in law school admissions processes. More importantly, Sander’s
arguments, if anything, reveal that our means for measuring merit in the
admissions processes in higher education, and in law schools specifically, are not class-neutral at all, but instead class-biased in favor of students from high-SES backgrounds. To our minds, such revelations support an overhaul of the way in which we consider students for admission
into law schools, not an overhaul of any existing affirmative action programs.

168. BART LANDRY, THE ECONOMIC STAGNATION OF THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS: A BRIEFING
BEFORE THE U NITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 24–25 (2005), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/122805_BlackAmericaStagnation.pdf (statement of Professor Landry,
Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park) (describing upper class occupations as an area of highly “intense” discrimination, and stating that “in 1983, with 43.4 percent and
35.7 percent of whites and blacks concentrated in the upper middle class, there was a gap of 7.7
percentage points. The gap worsened by 1990 before declining again by 2002, but is still standing at
about 8.1 percent”).
169. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1166 (“For example, studies have shown that ‘[f]or
every 72 cents a dark-skinned Black [makes], a light-skinned Black earn[s] a dollar.’” (alterations in
original)).

